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STATEMENT OF BASIS FOR REHEARING 
Appellant in this case now petitions this Court for a 
rehearing in this case pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah 
Court of Appeals. In affirming the decision of the trial court, 
the Court of Appeals misapprehended the application of the law as 
it applies to the present case. The Court of Appeals stated in 
it's Order of Affirmance that there was a "residuum of competent 
evidence" and in so stating relies on the courts holding in Kehl 
v. Schwendiman, 735 P.2d 413 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). The standard 
for review in this case is simple error, and this Court can find 
as a matter of law that error was committed. 
The Court of Appeals also overlooked the significance of jury 
instruction number 8. Jury instruction number 8 creates a 
mandatory rebuttable presumption, and places on the defendant the 
burden of disproving the element of the offence so affected by the 
presumption. This shifting of the burden is unconstitutional. 
The Court of Appeals misapprehended the issues in this case 
and misapplied Rule 31 of the Rule of the Utah Court of Appeals as 
it applies to this case. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
This court found in its Order Of Affirmance that "...there may 
be some difficulty with the lack of consistency concerning the 
intoxilyzer affidavit, statute, regulations, information and jury 
instruction, especially given the absence of correlative 
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testimony...". This court then goes on to state that "...there is 
a residuum of competent evidence indicating that defendant was 
under the influence of alcohol...". In support of this position 
the Court relies on the holding of this Court in Kehl v. 
Schwendiman, 735 P.2d 413 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). In Kehl the facts 
are highly distinguishable from the facts in the present case. The 
first and most obvious difference is the fact the Kehl was an 
appeal from an administrative hearing, here Mr. Bee appeals from 
a criminal conviction in the Circuit Court. In Kehl this Court 
followed a long line of cases (as cited therein) and stated 
"Although administrative agencies may rely upon hearsay evidence, 
a residuum of competent legal evidence must support the agencies 
finding." (citations omitted). This Court has misapplied the 
holding in Kehl as it applies to this case. In a criminal 
proceeding the finder of fact must find "beyond a reasonable doubt" 
and in the trial of Mr. Bee the jury was so instructed (see jury 
instruction numbered 10). The jury was instructed that they were 
to resolve doubts in favor of Mr. Bee (see jury instruction 
numbered 9) . In applying Kehl to the present case the Court 
overlooks this most critical burden which is placed on the State 
and the accompanying charges to the jury. The admission of the 
test record without proper foundation was highly prejudicial and 
conclusively reversible error. The balance of the evidence upon 
which the jury had to rely was inconclusive as to the issue of Mr. 
Bee's level of being under the influence of alcohol. It is 
extremely likely that the jury relied on the test results to 
substantiate their finding. The breath tests should have been 
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excluded because of lack of foundation; the affidavits should not 
have been admitted because of lack of foundation (see Murray City 
v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983) the Judge here did not make the 
requisite findings in order to admit the affidavits). The jury 
could only make a finding of guilt based upon the evidence 
improperly admitted or in the alternative by using a combination 
of the improperly admitted evidence along with other evidence 
admitted. That requires a reversal in this case. 
Point II 
This Court overlooked the significance of the error contained 
in jury instruction numbered 8. Therein the jury is instructed 
that if they find that a chemical test was given within two hours 
then "it shall be presumed" that that was the level of the 
defendants blood alcohol at the time of driving. This creates a 
mandatory rebuttable presumption. This then means that the jury 
is obligated to accept as fact that presumption unless the 
defendant presents sufficient evidence to rebut said presumed fact. 
This goes to one of the elements of the offence. That element is 
the blood alcohol level of the defendant at the time of driving. 
This type of presumption was denounced by the Court in State v. 
Chambers, 709 P.2d 321 (Utah 1985). The Court quotes Francis v. 
Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985) 
"A mandatory rebuttable presumption. . .relieves the State 
of the affirmative burden of persuasion of the presumed 
element by instructing the jury that it must find the 
presumed element unless the defendant persuades the jury 
not to make such a finding. A mandatory rebuttable 
presumption is perhaps less onerous [than an irrebuttable 
or conclusive presumption] from the defendant's 
perspective, but it is no less unconstitutional." (see 
Chambers at 326). 
This instruction is not only unconstitutional but it does not 
accurately state the law (compare Utah Code Annotated 41-6-44). 
The giving of this instruction was prejudicial error and would 
mandate the reversal of the trial court. This becomes even more 
obvious when the admission of the breath test and this instruction 
are looked at together. The Court can not ignore the synergistic 
outcome of the two errors taken together. 
Point III 
Rule 31 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals indicates 
that there are at least two classes of cases which are not amenable 
to disposition under Rule 31. This case falls into these two 
classes. They are first criminal cases and second cases which 
involve constitutional issues. This case is a criminal case, it 
arises from a conviction for driving while under the influence of 
alcohol. This case contains substantive constitutional issues in 
as much as the jury instruction numbered 8 unconstitutionally 
shifted the burden of proof and persuasion from the state to the 
defendant. According to Rule 31 either of these should be the 
basis for preclusion from Rule 31 disposition, both issues 
together should make that even more abundantly clear. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals incorrectly applied the Kehl case and the 
holding of the court therein. The Court overlooked the 
significance of the burden shifting instruction numbered 8 and the 
constitutional ramifications flowing therefrom. The court 
improperly considered this case under Rule 31. The defendant 
therefore respectfully requests this Court to rehear this case. 
CERTIFICATION OF GOOD FAITH 
I, D. Bruce Oliver attorney of record for the defendant and 
appellant,- hereby certify to this Court that this petition is filed 
and presented in good faith and not for any purpose of delay. 
Respectfully submitted this / 3 day of November, 1989. 
D. Bruce Oliver 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing this 
{ *% day of November, 1989, to: Steve Majors, Deputy Davis County 
Attorney, Courthouse, Farmington, Utah 84025. 
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